Cambridge Civic Journal Forum

3. A communication was received from Councillor Toner, transmitting proposed Charter Changes from Committee members. (from Jan 27 meeting)

Proposed Charter Updates

Submitted by:
Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler
Councillor Nolan
Councillor Wilson
Councillor Azeem

• City Council budget authority
  • Explanation:
    • Would give the City Council the power to increase parts of the annual budget by up to 10% compared to what is initially proposed by the City Manager – in addition to the Council’s current power to decrease parts of the budget – and as long as the overall budget total proposed by the City Manager remained the same
  • Rationale:
    • Would put the Cambridge City Council in line with the Boston City Council’s budget authority and would give the City Council the same budget authority the School Committee has
    • The City Council’s current ability to reduce parts of the budget is ineffective without the ability to also increase funding in other sections
    • In Cambridge, residents’ main ability to impact the budget during elections is through the City Council. The mechanisms the Council has to influence the budget are currently not as clear as they could be
    • The Council having the power to increase parts of the budget would reduce the likelihood of the Council rejecting a proposed budget altogether, which would cause instability and potential staff layoffs
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect upon passage for the following budget cycle
• Solicitor appointed by the City Council
  • Explanation:
    • The City Solicitor would be appointed by the City Council in a process similar to how the Council currently hires the City Clerk and the City Auditor. The appointment and any reappointment or termination would be the responsibility of the City Council
  • Rationale:
    • The head of the City’s Law Department should be selected by the body tasked with drafting Cambridge’s municipal laws
    • The City Solicitor plays an important role in representing City residents and staff and should be chosen by the branch of government directly elected by voters.
    • A number of other cities including Malden currently have this structure for the City Solicitor
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect upon passage
• Elected mayor alongside a City Manager similar to Worcester
  • Explanation:
    • City Council candidates would declare on the ballot whether they are also interested in serving as Mayor
    • In addition to appearing on the City Council section of the ballot, these candidates would appear on the Mayor section of the ballot
    • Voters would elect the Mayor via Ranked Choice Voting
    • The Mayor would retain the same powers they wield currently, alongside the City Manager, who would retain the same powers the position wields currently
  • Rationale:
    • Having a mayor who is popularly elected – similar to mayors in surrounding communities – would strengthen the mayor’s position in representing Cambridge and speaking on behalf of residents in regional forums
    • Cambridge’s current mayoral system can be confusing for residents
    • Currently, candidates are not asked to explain their vision for chairing the School Committee since it is unclear until after the election who will be potential candidates for Mayor in the following term. An elected mayor would require candidates to explain to voters their vision as chair of the School Committee and lead representative for the City
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect starting with the 2027 municipal election
• 4 year terms, with elections every 2 years
  • Explanation:
    • City Council terms would be extended to four years. Elections would still occur every two years, with five Council seats and the mayor up for election in one cycle, and four seats up for election two years later
    • Other aspects of City Council elections like ranked choice voting and atlarge proportional representation would remain constant
  • Rationale:
    • Two year terms provide insufficient time for Councillors and City staff to accomplish the work of city government before campaign season begins again
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect starting with the 2027 municipal election

Submitted by:
Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler
Councillor Nolan
Councillor Wilson

• Department heads appointed by the City Manager and approved by the Council
  • Explanation:
    • The City Manager would submit Department Head appointments and reappointments for approval by the City Council in a process similar to how the Council approves appointments to Boards and Commissions
  • Rationale:
    • Department Heads play a significant role in collaborating with the Council to achieve its goals and in executing the policies enacted by the Council
    • A number of other cities including Framingham currently have this structure for the appointment of Department Heads
    • The School Committee approves appointments of several director positions including CFO, assistant superintendents, and the head of special education
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect upon passage for new appointments and reappointments going forward

2. A communication was received from City Solicitor Megan Bayer, transmitting the Law Department’s response to City Council proposals regarding Charter changes. (from Jan 27 meeting)

January 27, 2025

Yi-An Huang
City Manager
Cambridge City Hall
795 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139

Re: Response to City Council Proposals Regarding Charter Changes.

Dear Mr. Huang,

The following is being presented in response to the five proposed changes to the City of Cambridge’s charter as presented by members of the City Council. Councillor Toner, Co-Chair of the Special Committee of the City Council, requested City staff provide comments assessing the potential impacts and implications of these proposals. This response summarizes responses from the Law Department, Election Commission, Finance Department, and City department heads who have reviewed the proposals to evaluate their potential impacts.

The City’s departments and staff share the Council’s goal to strengthen our democracy, create a more inclusive local government, and chart a path toward more transparency and accountability. In this continuous endeavor, City staff appreciate the opportunity to provide their perspective and concerns regarding these proposed charter changes.

1. Proposal for City Council Budget Authority: “Would give the City Council the power to increase parts of the annual budget by up to 10% compared to what is initially proposed by the City Manager—in addition to the Council’s current power to decrease parts of the budget—and as long as the overall budget total proposed by the City Manager remained the same.”

Impacts: This proposal would fundamentally change how the City’s budget process works, with significant impacts to the City’s financial stability, ability to support Council priorities, and accountability. The proposal states that this would provide the Council with the same budget authority as the Boston City Council’s but does not account for the Mayor’s separate political authority and formal veto power in Boston’s system. The existing structure where the Council hires, reviews, and can terminate the City Manager provides significant authority to shape the budget through an appropriate governance relationship.

A. The current budget process places Cambridge in a strong fiscal position that enables the City to support the Council’s priorities.

• Developing an annual budget is a lengthy, year-round process for the City administration and requires the involvement of many employees with operational, programmatic, and financial expertise. The City Council may not have the time and budget analysis capacity to ensure that budget amendments are fiscally responsible and operationally feasible, or to weigh the trade-offs that come from reducing one department’s budget to increase funding in another area.
• The current budget process has placed Cambridge in a strong fiscal position and has given the Council appropriate authority to set budget direction in a responsible, planned, and thought-out manner, resulting in substantial investments in universal preschool, affordable housing, climate, cycling safety ordinance, after-school programs, and much more. The Finance Committee plays a key role in guiding the budget process. Material amendments to the budget have been made during budget hearings based on Council feedback including added funding to the Public Health Department and Affordable Housing Trust in FY24.

B. The City’s long-term financial sustainability and credit worthiness is based on consistent and stable financial planning. Significant increases and decreases late in the annual budget process create significant risk.

• The goal of the existing process is to work out funding priorities and City Council interests early in the budgeting process so the City Manager and City staff can assess financial impacts and plan the budget to meet those goals. Significant last-minute changes to the budget undermines the cooperation between the two branches through the budget process and compromises shared governance, transparency, and accountability.
• Significant increases and decreases in the budget by City Councillors would ultimately require a great deal of staff time to reconcile and reallocate, which increases the likelihood that the City will enter the next fiscal year without an approved final budget. This could negatively impact the quality and frequency of services the City provides, due to sudden elimination of programs, personnel, and potentially departments in order to balance the budget. This would also have an adverse impact on hirings and employee retention.
• Decreases and increases totaling 10% of the budget represent a significant and material change. Based on the FY25 Budget, 10% would constitute almost $100 million dollars that potentially could be reallocated, removed, or canceled if reallocation is not possible. Even at a departmental level, this amounts to millions of dollars. Further, large budget-line items cannot be reduced (e.g., debt service, pension funding, health insurance, collectively bargained salary increases) which means that 10% of a total budget represents a much larger percentage change than it appears. Additional challenges could occur with the elimination of union positions or contractual obligations without appropriate process, which could lead to union grievances and litigation.

C. A key difference between Cambridge and Boston is that Boston has a Strong Mayor system of government, and the Mayor can veto budget amendments that negatively impact programs and Boston’s finances.

• The Boston City Council can override a veto should it be committed to budget changes. In Council/Manager forms of government, City Managers are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the City Council, who can terminate them if they are not responsive. The City Manager has no veto power in the event the Council’s proposed changes were not feasible, fiscally irresponsible, illegal, or would otherwise negatively impact programs or core operational functions.

2. Proposal for City Solicitor Appointment by the City Council: “The City Solicitor would be appointed by the City Council in a process similar to how the Council currently hires the City Clerk and the City Auditor. The appointment and any reappointment or termination would be the responsibility of the City Council.”

Impacts: This proposal overemphasizes the legislative function of the City Solicitor, who also has significant responsibilities over legal administration, employment and labor matters, litigation, and contracts. The current structure provides an avenue for Council authority through the City Manager and does not risk politicizing the role or undermining the Solicitor’s ability to represent the City.

A. The City Solicitor must be able to provide impartial legal advice to both the City Administration and the City Council.

• The larger portion of the City Solicitor’s responsibilities are to ensure the City Administration is well represented and making sound legal decisions. While advising the Council on legislation is a critical part of the role, it’s important that the Solicitor is hired and managed as part of the City Administration rather than as an extension of the legislative branch.
• The existing system provides significant authority for the Council through feedback and management of the City Manager, especially with the implementation of a rigorous and transparent annual performance review process.

B. Making the City Solicitor position a political hire limits the ability to recruit and retain qualified candidates.

• Requiring the City Solicitor to be appointed and reappointed by the City Council could undermine the ability to attract the best applicants, who may have concerns about the politics of public appointment, re-appointment, and review.

C. The public hiring and approval process could undermine the City Solicitor’s ability to represent the City.

• Approval, reapproval, and hiring process would be public and could not be done in executive session. Opponents in legal cases against the City could potentially glean legal strategies and positions of the City from the City Solicitor’s required disclosures to the City Council.

3. Proposal for City Council Approval of City Manager’s Department Head Appointments: “The City Manager would be required to submit all Department Head appointments and reappointments for approval by the City Council in a process similar to how the Council approves appointments to Boards and Commissioners.”

Impacts: This proposal would undermine the executive authority and accountability of the City Manager, make the hiring of department heads more political, and make it harder for the City to recruit and hire the best candidates.

A. The current structure provides the Council clear accountability and feedback to the City Manager over department performance.

• Under this proposal, the City Manager would not have authority to hire, manage, and terminate department heads, which would significantly undermine the executive function of the City. This would be less transparent and accountable, and does not represent best practices in governance, particularly for a large and complex organization dedicated to high performance.
• The existing system provides significant authority for the Council through feedback and management of the City Manager, especially with the implementation of a rigorous and transparent annual performance review process.

B. The political nature of requiring approval and renewals of department head appointments by the City Council create barriers to City leadership and staff effectively doing their jobs.

• Fear of losing City Council approval or reapproval could result in reduced candor from department heads on issues facing the City. Department heads could be afraid of performing their duties, even if legally required, if such actions could impact on a Councillor’s interests or constituency.

C. Making department heads political hires limits the ability to recruit and retain qualified candidates.

• Requiring department heads to be appointed and reappointed by the City Council could undermine the ability to attract the best applicants, who may have concerns about the politics of public appointment, re-appointment, and review.
• Requiring appointments would create terms for all department heads, which would potentially create short-term uncertainty and further make leadership positions in the City of Cambridge unattractive.

4. Proposal for an elected Mayor alongside a City Manager (similar to Worcester): “City Council candidates would declare on the ballot whether they are also interested in serving as mayor. In addition to appearing on the City Council section of the ballot, these candidates would also appear on the Mayor section of the ballot. Voters would elect the Mayor via Ranked Choice Voting. The Mayor would retain the same powers they wield currently, alongside the City Manager, who would retain the same powers the position wields currently.”

Impacts: This proposal is similar to how Worcester selects a mayor. However, there are differences, which have operational implications and could lead to discrepancies. The key difference is that Worcester does not have proportional/ranked choice voting. Instead, Worcester has a hybrid form of representative government consisting of at-large and district representation. In Worcester, only at-large candidates can run for mayor.

A. Having the mayoral and city councillor races on separate ballots could cause discrepancies in our proportional representation/ranked choice system.

• Because of the format of the City’s ranked choice voting ballots, the mayoral race and council race would need to be printed on two separate ballots, unlike in Worcester where they are printed on the same page. Voters are not required to vote in any race they do not wish to vote in. For example, in the current systems, some voters only vote for City Council and not for School Committee, and vice versa. Adding a third ballot raises the possibility that voters could opt to only vote for mayor and not City Council and School Committee, or ignore the mayoral ballot entirely. There is therefore a possibility that at the end of an election the voting tallies for City Council and for mayor are materially different.
• If its required that the winner of the mayoral election must also win a City Council seat, situations could arise where a candidate wins the mayoral race but does not win a seat on the City Council, or where a City Council candidate receives the highest number of votes for councillor but does not win the mayoral race.

B. Additional areas for consideration.

• Adding an extra ballot will require additional processing time at the polls, which could discourage voter participation. Voters may opt to leave early or only request ballots for certain races to save time. The extra ballot may also lead to voter confusion.
• Election procedures would need to be updated to account for additional nomination papers for mayor, including separate requirements for nomination papers.
• The City Council may also want to consider additional areas such as term limits and role on the School Committee.

5. Proposal for four-year terms for City Councillors with elections every two years: “City Council terms would be extended to four years. Elections would still occur every two years, with five Council seats and the mayor up for election in one cycle, and four seats up for election two years later. Other aspects of City Council elections like rank choice voting and at-large proportional representation would remain constant.”

Impacts: Staggering the at-large City Council seats into a five seat/four seat cycle results in multiple issues that could potentially jeopardize the City’s proportional/ranked choice voting system. Staggering City Council seats creates different vote quotas for each cycle, leading to a less representative Council, a high likelihood for civil rights lawsuits against the City, and implications for the School Committee.

A. Cycle One structurally becomes more desirable for candidates, as the vote quota is lower and the Mayor can only be elected in Cycle One.

• Quota in the City’s proportional/ranked choice voting system is determined by dividing the total number of valid ballots cast by the number of positions to be elected plus one and then adding one to the resulting dividend, disregarding fractions.
• Currently, there are nine City Council seats open every municipal election. Assuming 25,000 ballots were cast, the present quota needed to win a seat on the City Council would be 2,501. (25,000 divided by 10 (9 seats plus 1), plus 1).
• Cycle One would have five seats open. Again, assuming 25,000 ballots were cast, the quota needed to win a seat on the City Council would now be 4,167. (25,000 divided by 6 (5 seats plus 1), plus 1).
• Cycle Two would have four seats open. Again, assuming 25,000 ballots were cast, the quota needed to win a seat on the City Council would now be 5,501. (25,000 divided by 5 (4 seats plus 1), plus 1).
  • As a result, it is harder for a candidate to run for office running in Cycle One and Two compared to the City’s current municipal election quotas.
  • It is also much harder for a candidate to win an election in Cycle Two compared to Cycle One. In fact, a candidate would need to double the number of votes needed compared to the City’s current municipal election quotas.
• This structural unfairness is amplified with the Mayor only being elected in Cycle One. No candidate running in Cycle Two would ever have the opportunity to become mayor.

B. In the staggered system, the difference in the voting cycles hinders the system’s ability to fairly represent the City.

• Danger of interest groups, political parties, or bad actors attempting to influence the election by making large campaign donations and having favored candidates elected in a “bloc” in Cycle One. If all five seats are won by candidates supported by these interests, they would have a foolproof majority for four years, regardless of who wins in Cycle Two.
• The higher vote quota in Cycle Two favors candidates with more resources and better funding, due to the need to reach out and convince more voters to meet the quota. Minority candidates, new candidates, or candidates with less resources are more likely to lose as a result.
• Staggering the terms would result in a less representative and diverse council. The reason multi-winner ranked choice is called Proportional Representation is because it allows minority groups of voters to be represented in proportion to their share of the electorate. The more elected, the more the body reflects the diversity of the electorate.
  • For example, under the current 9-member system, minority groups can win at least one seat on the City Council with 10-15% of the voters, where they only need at least 10% to reach quota.
  • With staggered terms, this minority group would have no representation, as they would need at least 16.7% of voters in Cycle One and at least 20% of voters in Cycle Two to get even one seat. Majority groups would dominate both cycles in comparison to the current system, and the City Council would be less reflective of the diversity of the voters.

C. There are potential implications on the School Committee, which currently consists of six seats elected at-large with the Mayor as the seventh member and Chair.

• If the School Committee members also have staggered four-year terms, the unfairness issues noted in Cycle One and Cycle Two are further amplified.
  • Currently, there are six School Committee seats open every municipal election. Assuming 25,000 ballots were cast, the present quota needed to win a seat on the School Committee would be 3,572. (25,000 divided by 7 (6 seats plus 1), plus 1).
  • If divided into cycles, there would only be three School Committee seats open every municipal election. Again, assuming 25,000 ballots were cast, the quota needed to win a seat on the School Committee would be 6,251 (25,000 divided by 4, plus 1).
• This further increases the importance of the Cycle One election, as the mayor serves as chair of the School Committee. Again, interest groups, political parties, or bad actors could, through campaign donations or influence, have favored candidates win the mayoral race and all school committee seats, giving them a foolproof majority for four years regardless of who wins in Cycle Two.

D. These issues raise a high likelihood of civil rights lawsuits against the City on the basis that the voting system now perpetuates unfairness towards minorities and candidates with less resources. The City could be forced to abandon Proportional Representation as a result.

• E.g.: Huot v. City of Lowell, 17-CV-10895 (D. Mass. 2017). Minority Hispanic/Latino and Khmer voters sued the City of Lowell, alleging that the City’s at-large, one-person one-vote system of municipal elections diluted their votes and prevented their ability to elect candidates of their choice. As part of a Federal Consent Decree, Lowell agreed to abandon the at-large, one-person one-vote system and change its municipal election system to either an at-large, ranked choice voting system or a hybrid at-large/district system. The at-large ranked choice voting system would have allowed Hispanic/Latino and Khmer voters to elect candidates of their choice with at least 10-15% of total votes and nine council seats. With the hybrid at-large/district system, districts are drawn so that some are majority Hispanic/Latino and Khmer.

We will be available to discuss further and answer questions at the Special Committee meeting. Additionally, the Law Department is in the process of incorporating the Special Committee’s December 9, 2024 votes into the draft charter prepared by the Charter Review Committee, as well as noting other areas in the draft charter for the Council’s consideration, and we will provide the draft charter to the Council after incorporating any additional changes that are voted on at this meeting.

Very Truly Yours,
Megan B. Bayer
City Solicitor

Alternate Charter Proposals
(submitted by Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler for Feb 13, 2025 meeting)

Budget

• Option 1: City Council can increase parts of the budget by up to 1% with 90 days notice
  • The City Council shall have the authority to increase parts of the annual budget by up to 1% compared to what is initially proposed by the City Manager as long as the overall budget total proposed by the City Manager remained the same
  • The Council must declare their intent to make changes to the budget at least 90 before the end of the current fiscal year to give the City Manager time to propose alternative changes
• Option 2: Earlier budget presentation timeline in charter for Council feedback
  • The City Manager shall present an initial draft budget to the City Council by January of the previous fiscal year
  • The City Council shall make a favorable recommendation with no suggested changes, a neutral recommendation with some suggested changes, or a negative recommendation with significant suggested changes
  • The City Manager shall the present their final budget, including a written response to the suggestions put forward by the Council, for a Council vote along the current timeline
• Option 3: Council budget requests and an initial budget presentation by the City Manager required in charter
  • The City Council shall submit its requests for the coming fiscal year’s budget by December of the previous fiscal year
  • The City Manager shall take the Council’s requests into consideration and present an initial draft budget to the City Council by January of the previous fiscal year
  • The City Council shall make a favorable recommendation, a neutral recommendation, or a negative recommendation
  • The City Manager shall the present their final budget for a Council vote along the current timeline
• Option 4: City Manager presents initial budget with 1% of funds unallocated for Council feedback
  • The City Manager shall present an initial draft budget to the City Council by December of the previous fiscal year—the budget shall include 1% of funds unallocated awaiting Council feedback
  • The City Council shall provide direction to the City Manager on the unallocated funds, along with feedback on the rest of the budget, by the end of January of the previous fiscal year
  • The City Manager may include suggestions for the unallocated funds along with the initial presentation to the City Council
  • The City Manager shall the present their final budget for a Council vote along the current timeline

Solicitor

• Option 1: City Council can remove with two-thirds support
  • Appointment of the Solicitor shall remain a prerogative of the City Manager
  • With the support of two-thirds of City Councillors, the Council may remove the City Solicitor
  • The City Manager shall be in charge of appointing a replacement
• Option 2: City Council can remove with a simple majority, subject to veto
  • Appointment of the Solicitor would remain a prerogative of the City Manager
  • With the support of a majority of City Councillors, the Council could remove the City Solicitor
  • The City Manager would have the power to veto the removal, which could be overridden by a unanimous vote of the City Council
  • The City Manager shall be in charge of appointing the replacement
• Option 3: The City Council appoints the Solicitor, the City Manager may remove
  • Appointment of the Solicitor would become a prerogative of the City Council
  • Only the City Manager may remove a current City Solicitor
  • The City Council may only appoint a replacement Solicitor when a vacancy occurs, either via a retirement or removal by the City Manager. A new City Council would retain the City Solicitor from the previous term
• Option 4: City Council can remove with unanimous support from the entire City Council
  • Appointment of the Solicitor shall remain a prerogative of the City Manager
  • With the unanimous support of the City Council, the Council may remove the City Solicitor
  • The City Manager shall be in charge of appointing a replacement

Elected mayor alongside a City Manager

• Option A:
  • There shall remain only one ballot for City Council elections
  • The City Council candidate with the most #1 votes shall become mayor
  • The mayor shall retain the same powers the position wields currently including serving as chair of the School Committee, alongside the City Manager, who would retain the same powers the position wields currently
  • A candidate must have served at least one term on the City Council prior to becoming mayor. If the candidate receiving the most #1 votes has not served at least one term on the City Council, the eligible candidate who has received the second most #1 votes shall become mayor
  • The mayor may serve no more than three consecutive terms as mayor. If the candidate receiving the most #1 votes has served for three consecutive terms as mayor, the eligible candidate who has received the second most #1 votes shall become mayor
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect starting with the 2027 municipal election
• Option B:
  • There shall remain only one ballot for City Council elections
  • The City Council candidate who is ranked by voters on the greatest number of ballots shall become mayor
  • The mayor shall retain the same powers the position wields currently including serving as chair of the School Committee, alongside the City Manager, who would retain the same powers the position wields currently
  • A candidate must have served at least one term on the City Council prior to becoming mayor. If the candidate receiving the most votes has not served at least one term on the City Council, the eligible candidate who has been ranked by voters on the second greatest number of ballots shall become mayor
  • The mayor may serve no more than three consecutive terms as mayor. If the candidate receiving the most votes has served for three consecutive terms as mayor, the eligible candidate who has been ranked by voters on the second greatest number of ballots shall become mayor
  • Implementation:
    • Would take effect starting with the 2027 municipal election

February 11, 2025

Cambridge City Council
Cambridge City Hall
795 Massachusetts Avenue, 2nd Floor
Cambridge, MA 02139

Re: Response to City Council Proposals Regarding Charter Changes.

To the Honorable, the City Council:

After the January 27, 2025 Special Meeting of the City Council, Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler prepared alternative options for the selection of the mayor and requested input and feedback from the Law Department and Election Commission staff. Law Department and Election Commission staff reviewed the options Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler prepared and provided feedback regarding the implications of the proposals to him and Co-Chairs Siddiqui and Toner. The following options presented in this memorandum reflect the options presented by Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler with incorporated feedback from the Law Department, Election Commission staff, and the co-chairs.

Please note that these options have not been fully studied and that their feasibility and impact on voter behavior is unknown. Additional study may reveal further issues that could not have been anticipated without study and testing. The Election Commission also has not had the opportunity to review the proposals and provide input, depending on the direction the City Council wishes to proceed on this issue. When considering the options, the City Council should consider these overarching questions regarding any potential process.

1. What voting system are you using to select the mayor? Will it be ranked choice, or some other model?

2. How many ballots will be used? Will City Council and Mayoral race be on the same ballot or separate ballots?

3. Will there be an eligibility requirement to be mayor?

4. Will there be term limits for those serving as mayor? If so, what are those limits?

Option #1 – Ranked Choice

Electoral process:
To maintain the ranked choice system to elect the mayor, the election software could be run to elect nine councillors and then rernn to elect a single winner out of only those candidates who are eligible to become mayor. For example, if there are seven (7) eligible for mayor (councilors who have served at least one term) out of twenty-five (25) candidates on the ballot, the software would be rerun using only those seven names. If one of the seven indicated that they did not want to be mayor, then the software would be rerun using only those six candidates who expressed interest in running. The candidate who wins the rerun would be mayor elect.

Eligibility:
Eligible candidates for mayor will indicate they are interested in both seats when picking up nomination paper before circulation to voters. The Candidate must have served at least one (1) term as city councillor to be eligible to be a candidate for mayor. Eligible candidates for mayor will indicate they are interested in both seats when picking up nomination paper before circulation to voters. It is a policy decision for the Council to decide what eligibility criteria to include in the Charter.

Ballot Wording:
The eligible candidates would appear on the ballot with the words “Eligible for Mayor” next to their name and/or words “Candidate for Re-Election” depending on their eligibility. For example, a candidate who served a term, did not run for reelection, but qualifies to run again in the following election cycle would not be a “Candidate for Re-Election.” However, they would be allowed to have the “Eligible for Mayor” wording next to their name on the ballot because they served one term as councillor. It is a policy decision for the Council to decide what eligibility criteria to include in the Charter.

Term Limits:
The mayor may serve no more than two (2) consecutive terms as mayor. After two terms the candidate would no longer be eligible to submit nomination papers for mayor and city councillor. The candidate would only be permitted to circulate papers for city council and appear on the ballot only as “Candidate for Re-Election” to the office as city councillor. Again, it is a policy decision for the Council about what term limits to include.

Implications of Option #1:
By keeping ranked choice voting, it may be possible to conduct city council and mayoral races on the same ballot. However, this would have potential impacts on voter behavior, which is discussed further below. Employing ranked choice could also help to maintain continuity with the City’s proportional/ranked choice voting system with both races.

Option #2 -Adopt Another Process Without Ranked Choice

Electoral process:
The candidate receiving the highest first choice (#1) votes and is eligible to run for mayor and city councillor shall become mayor. Note that this selection method would not select the mayor by ranked choice. This leads to issues in that you are running two elections with differing methodologies.

Eligibility, ballot wording, term limits:
Process and issues raised would be the same as Option #1.

Implications of Option #2:
Electing a mayor by having the candidate with the highest number of first choice votes conflicts with the City’s proportional/ranked choice voting system because you are selecting the person with only the most frrst choice (#1) votes. As such, you are abandoning ranked choice voting in selecting the mayor while keeping it for selecting the councilors. The effect of Option #2 could fundamentally alter voter behavior in a more pronounced way than Option #1, which maintains ranked choice voting.

Possible Issues with Options #1 and #2

There may need to be separate ballots for mayor and city council races. The city’s equipment and programing will need to be studied to determine feasibility.

Having a candidate’s vote rank determine their eligibility for mayor could alter a voter’s behavior that influences their vote, disfavoring candidates they would otherwise support. (E.g. “I support that candidate for city council, but now I will not rank them high because I don’t like the idea of them being mayor.”) Will voters feel disenfranchised when selecting a candidate for city council if they feel forced to rank them low because they do not want them to be mayor, or vice versa?

Other examples of possible altered voter behavior: If a voter wants to vote for only non-incumbents, then they will have no say in voting for who will be mayor. Or they will feel obligated to give one of the incumbents a ranking so that they do have a say in mayor, when otherwise they would not rank that candidate for just the city council. Or they might feel they have to give their number one vote to one of the incumbents eligible for mayor instead of a candidate they might prefer who is not eligible for mayor. The possibility of these changes giving incumbents advantages will need to be assessed for potential electoral and legal impacts.

Concerns have also been raised regarding the stipulation that to be eligible for the position of mayor, a candidate must have served at least one term as a city councillor. No other elected office in the City has had such a prerequisite, which could impose limitations for new candidates, could negatively influence voter behavior, and potentially discourage candidates from running for office.

Option #3 – Alternative Mayor Selection Process Not Codified in Charter

Electoral process:
The mayor would be selected via Option #1 or Option #2, but the process would not be codified in the charter. Instead, the City Council would establish the process via another method, such as policy order, ordinance, the council’s rules, or agreement between the councillors. The City’s charter would contain the same language where the city council would select the mayor via majority vote. See Section 97, City Plan E Charter. Additional language would be added, however, authorizing the City Council to select an alternative method for choosing the mayor if they wish.

Implications of Option #3:
Given that the City has never elected a mayor before in a ranked choice election, has not studied full implications regarding the proposal, and has not had the opportunity to meet with Election Commission, election experts, state officials, and the City’s equipment vendors to assess feasibility or process, codifying a mayoral change in the charter now without further study could result in the discovery of issues and errors that could not be fixed without amending the charter again. Option #3 would avoid the potential dangers of codifying a process in the charter that has not been studied or tested.

In the event mayoral selection process had major issues, disenfranchises voters, or is legally challenged, it would be easier under Option #3 to revise the mayor selection process without having to amend the charter again. As such, Option #3 does offer a sort of “emergency fallback position,” where the city council could choose the mayor from among the members through the traditional way in the event the system does not work or it was forced to abandon the new process. With additional time, the Election Commission could also work with the City’s election vendors and ranked choice voting experts to get opinions and run the software with experimental ballots and nomination papers to see the impacts and to prevent voter disenfranchisement.

Very Truly Yours,
Megan B. Bayer
City Solicitor